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THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER

A REVIEW OF SOVIET WRITING
ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA



PRICE SEVEN SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE

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The Mizan Newsletter aims at giving an objective and balanced account of current Soviet writings on the Middle East and Africa

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MIDDLE EAST

Soviet Reactions to Anti-Communism in Iraq reviews the gradual increase in Soviet press references to the "persecution of democrats" in Iraq, leading up to the recent campaign of protests to Gen. Qasim from Soviet organizations.

Land Reform in the UAR and Iraq is an account of some first-hand descriptions by Soviet journalists of the progress and shortcomings of agrarian reform measures in these countries.

The Soviet Version of the Soviet-Persian Talks of 1958-9 is a summary of an article in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' which gives a detailed account of these negotiations, seeking to lay the blame for their breakdown solely on the Persian side.

The Middle East in the Soviet Press includes recent items on Turkish-Soviet relations.

AFRICA

Soviet Writing on the Sudan reviews Soviet accounts of the condominium regime, the independence movement, Soviet-Egyptian relations and the Sudan's policy since independence.

Africa in the Soviet Press includes Soviet reports on Brezhnev's visit to Morocco, Guinea and Ghana and on the situation in the Congo.

ANTI-COMMUNISM IN IRAQ: SOVIET REACTIONS

Until recently, Soviet strictures on anti-Communist measures in Iraq were mainly confined to isolated press references. The matter has now been put before the Soviet and Arab public in no uncertain fashion by the publication in the Soviet press, and the broadcasting in Moscow radio's Arabic transmissions, of protests to Qasim against the arrests and trials of "democratic" trade unionists, students and others.

Soviet accounts of the Iraqi revolution emphasized the role of the Iraqi Communist Party, as part of the National Union Front, in preparing the ground for the revolution; and during the republic's first year the Soviet public was allowed to assume that complete solidarity existed between the Party and the Iraqi Government. Thus IZVESTIYA (2.6.59) noted that Qasim, when asked in an interview with Mr. Anthony Nutting about his attitude towards the Communists, spoke of them as patriots who did nothing against the country's interests.

The first evidence of Soviet concern at the relations between the Communist Party and the government appeared in August 1959. KOMMUNIST (No.12 of 1959) published in full, and PRAVDA (17.8.59) in part, a statement issued by the Iraqi Communist Party admitting to serious "leftist political errors" in its relations with the government on the one hand and the rank and file on the other. Individuals, it was stated, had resorted to acts of violence; "undisciplined elements" would be purged from the Party. This was presumably a reference to the Kirkuk disorders of 14th July, in which the Communists played a leading part - although these were not specifically mentioned. The only Soviet comment on the Party's statement (SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK No.9 of 1959) represented it as a call for closer cooperation with the "national bourgeois" forces. But the Kirkuk disorders themselves were the subject of an article in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No.9 of 1959) which blamed them on "reactionary" elements and maintained that such was also the view of Qasim himself - although in fact Qasim had consistently attributed the outrages to "anarchists", which was commonly taken as meaning Communists (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.11 of 1959).

The failure of the Iraqi Communist Party to secure official recognition as such, and the licensing of Dawud as-Sa'igh's rival "Iraqi Communist Party in its Legal Form", were reported in the Soviet press at the time (PRAVDA 1.3.60; NEW TIMES No.9 of 1960). Yu. Bochkarev said of the latter party: "Until January no one had ever heard of such a party. It simply did not exist. Now it is the signboard behind which a small group of people far removed from the Communist ideology are hiding." However, there was no direct Soviet criticism of the action of the Iraqi authorities in this matter.

The measures against ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B The first direct Soviet criticisms of action against the (original) Iraqi Communist Party appeared in October and November 1960. PRAVDA (4.10.60) reported that Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, editor of the Communist organ ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B, had been sentenced to three months' imprisonment, and the paper had been closed down. This, said PRAVDA, was "not a solitary instance of attack on the democratic press"; the chief editor of the Basrah workers' newspaper SAWT AT-TALI'AH had also been arrested.

Later (4.11.60) PRAVDA published a three-column dispatch from its Baghdad correspondent P. Demchenko on the anti-Communist campaign in Iraq. Demchenko praised ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B for its patriotic defence of Iraq's national interests and for its exposure of "the machinations of the oil companies" and "the activities of internal reaction", and denounced the "campaign against the democratic press" conducted by Right-wing newspapers which published "malicious anti-Communist articles" of obvious American inspiration. He went on:

> "The matter was not confined only to a noisy newspaper campaign. Groups of fascist youths made an attack on the editorial office of ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B in Baghdad, and sacked its branch in Mosul. The administration of seven of the 14 Iraqi governorates banned the publication and distribution of the newspaper. At the same time a campaign was begun not only against the Iraqi Communists...but also against other national patriotic organizations. Attacks and outrages were committed against trade unions, the Union of Democratic Youth and social mass organizations. Even the activity of the National Peace Defenders' Council, in whose support Premier Qasim had frequently spoken, was declared by the above-mentioned [Right-wing] newspapers to be 'subversive'."

In one of its last issues, said Demchenko, ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B had pointed out that the prosecution of its editor had coincided with the resumption of discussions between the government and the oil companies; and in fact the prosecution of the newspaper served the interests only of the oil companies "and of all enemies of the national independence, rights and freedom of the people".

Qasim, said Demchenko, had given orders for the release of Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, "thereby showing his attitude towards the court's decision"; but this had not been to the liking of reactionary circles, and now the president of the Basrah dockworkers' union Yahya Salih had been arrested. The democratic public of Iraq hoped that the government would put an end to the persecution of ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B and its editor.

The measures against trade unionists The formation of the Iraqi federation of trade unions, on the eve of the first anniversary of the republic, was welcomed in the Soviet press. Demchenko (PRAVDA 17.7.59) noted

that the federation represented 275,000 Iraqi workers, and that it had decided to join the World Federation of Trade Unions. TRUD reported (8.7.59) that a Soviet trade union delegation led by M.M. Musakhanov attended the federation's inaugural conference.

Subsequent Soviet references to the Iraqi trade unions spoke of their loyal support for the government and their keenness to build up the country's economy. Nihad Kirdar, an Iraqi oil workers' union leader, said in an article in NEW TIMES that all the unions loyally supported the government, "although their leaders do not all hold the same political views", and added: "Our patriotic duty in peacetime is to promote the country's economy." TRUD (14.11.59) published an interview with the secretary-general of the trade union federation, Talib Abd al-Jabar, who said that reactionary elements had been claiming that the democratic organizations, including the trade unions, were "undermining the foundations of the republic"; but these attempts to cause conflict between the government and the unions had "only partially succeeded", and the unions would make it their task to regain the government's full confidence. To increase labour productivity and to strengthen discipline and organization were now the paramount tasks; their good will was shown by the fact that at present they were not having recourse to strikes.

The first account of dismissals and arrests among trade unionists appeared in TRUD of 8th April 1960. A Basrah trade unionist who was afraid to give his full name said that the oil company had begun to dismiss trade union "activists" from work and that members of their committee had been imprisoned on a "lying accusation"; the local branch of the Union of Democratic Youth had been raided; and in Baghdad there had been other dismissals and arrests, including the temporary dismissal from work of Ali Shukr, the president of the trade union federation. On 27th October 1960 TRUD published an open letter from Ali Shukr to Qasim (previously published in ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B) alleging that the trade union elections had been deliberately falsified by the local authorities and that hundreds of trade union leaders and "activists" had been arrested without cause. Ali Shukr asked: "Is this interference in the elections of the leadership of the working class - which is a class devoted to the national regime - in the interests of the republic and the national government?"

WFTU, international Communist and Soviet protests Early in February the question of sentences passed on "Iraqi patriots" began to be publicized in the Soviet press. The first reports were of a protest made to the Iraqi Government by the World Federation of Trade Unions, and of denunciations of the sentences in the foreign Communist press; but soon protests by Soviet organizations began to be reported.

The WFTU action was reported in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (7 and 11.2.61) and, more briefly, in TRUD. According to these accounts, in November

the WFTU Secretary-General Louis Saillant had sent a letter to Qasim about "serious violations of trade union rights in Iraq"; Qasim had not replied. The WFTU Executive Committee, meeting in Berlin on 2nd-4th February, passed a resolution stating that, "in so far as attacks on the trade union and democratic movement in this country continue", it had decided to publish the letter sent to Qasim.

The letter expressed the WFTU's "profound indignation" at the reports received. "With great regret we have learnt that trade unionists are being persecuted and imprisoned, that trade union elections are being faked, and that even the central organ of the Iraqi general trade union federation, affiliated to the WFTU, has been banned and its chief editor arrested. Are these facts true? And have they been brought to your notice, Mr. Premier?" The letter went on to speak of WFTU approval of democratic measures taken in Iraq since the revolution, and WFTU solidarity with the Iraqi people and trade unions. "Astonishingly, but involuntarily, the question arises: are those forces which oppose imperialism and feudalism to be unable any more to make their contribution to the building of the new Iraqi state, which without this contribution will be exposed to the pressure of foreign monopolies?...We beg you to intervene personally to put an end to anti-democratic and anti-trade union measures in Iraq."

In quotations from the Czechoslovak newspaper RUDE PRAVO Soviet readers were given details of sentences passed on participants in the Mosul events of spring 1959. Sixty-two of the heroes who had defended the republic against Shawwaf's counter-revolutionary forces, said the newspaper, had been sentenced to death by hanging and dozens of others to life imprisonment or forced labour. The Iraqi press said that for 28 of them the death penalty had been commuted to imprisonment; but those still under sentence of death included Adnan Chulmiran, the lawyer Sati' Isma'il and Capt. Mahdi Hamid, former head of the Mosul people's resistance forces and member of the National Peace Defenders' Council. The Iraqi democratic press had published letters, including a letter to Qasim from 51 lawyers, demanding the quashing of the death sentences and a reconsideration of the Mosul case as a whole.

A Tass report from Baghdad (PRAVDA 8.2.61) said that a group of Iraqi journalists, lawyers and peace defenders had called on Col.Mahdawi, president of the former military tribunal, with a request for his co-operation towards the release of persons who had been imprisoned for a long time without charge. He promised to convey this request to the Premier.

Under the heading "We cannot keep silent" PRAVDA (10.2.61) published a telegram sent to Qasim by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. This said that reports of the sentences passed on Iraqi "public figures, trade unionists, patriots and democrats" had aroused the Soviet public's "profound alarm and indignation". The Soviet people had wel-

comed the Iraqi revolution, which had strengthened the peoples' anti-imperialist front, and they had frequently shown their brotherly solidarity with the Iraqi people against imperialism; they could not therefore keep silent when the threat of death and imprisonment lay over dozens of the best sons of the brotherly Iraqi people, who had fought in the front ranks for the victory of the July revolution and staunchly defended the young republic against imperialism and internal reaction in the spring of 1959.

> "Such unjust repressions only play into the hands of the imperialists and their agents and damage the sacred cause of strengthening the solidarity of the Afro-Asian peoples. In the name of millions of Soviet people the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee calls on you, Mr. Premier, to revoke the sentences passed on Iraqi patriots, to release the imprisoned fighters of the national liberation movement, and not to allow the shining ideals of the Iraqi revolution to be stained by the blood of its most loyal and steadfast defenders."

Similar telegrams to the above were sent to Qasim by the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations, the All-Union Central Trade Union Committee, the Union of Soviet Writers, the Union of Soviet Journalists, and the President and Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA 8.2.61; TRUD 12, 15 and 17.2.61).

KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA (11.2.61) reported that the matter was brought up at the second conference of the league of Iraqi students studying in the USSR, held in Moscow University on 10th February. Muhammad Karim Mashta, the chairman of the league, said in his opening speech that, according to the latest reports, "a number of progressive figures" were being persecuted in Iraq: "we demand that the government should cease interfering in the affairs of the Iraqi General Union of Students, since such interference only plays into the hands of the enemies of the Iraqi people." The conference enthusiastically applauded the announcement by M.I. Zhuravleva, Vice-President of the International Union of Students, that the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations had sent a telegram to Qasim demanding that the persecution of "progressive public figures" in Iraq should be stopped.

LAND REFORM IN THE UAR AND IRAQ

Soviet accounts of land reform in Iraq have emphasized the partial character of the measures so far undertaken (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.1 of 1960). As regards the UAR, and the Syrian region in particular, internal reforms under the present government are now little mentioned in Soviet publications. The 1960 Annual of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia gives

figures relating to land expropriation and distribution in the Syrian region, from which it notes that "about 14 per cent of the total number of peasant families" will benefit.

SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK has recently published some first-hand accounts by Soviet observers of the progress of agrarian reform in Iraq and in the Syrian region of the UAR. These point out the difficulties and onstacles which agrarian reform has encountered, and make it clear to the Soviet reader that to raise the level of agriculture in these countries will take a long time. The Soviet projects for dams and irrigation systems are mentioned, but it is pointed out that it will be many years before they are realized.

Difficulties in Syria In an article in SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK (No.10 of 1960) V. Katin describes a car journey which he made from Damascus to Aleppo, in company with the Syrian lawyer and journalist Khalil Zayn. Khalil Zayn, he says, emphasized to him the dependence of Syrian peasant agriculture on rainfall. There are also irrigated lands, he says, nearly 500,000 hectares of them. "These are basically the landowners' lands. But there are five million hectares of unirrigated lands. They feed the peasants." But, he says, the Syrians are not dejected:

> "We have strong hands and the desire to transform our life, and we have such a dependable friend as your country the Soviet Union. I read not long ago that the USSR will soon begin building a dam across the Euphrates in the region of Dayr az-Zor. This will permit the irrigation of 300,000 hectares of land. The Arab proverb says: 'In the morning one does not need a lamp.' So for us the Soviet aid does not need any commentary."

Khalil Zayn then speaks of the agrarian reform:

> "You know, of course, that since 1958 we have been carrying out an agrarian reform. It has been pressing for a long time. As was to be expected, the reform aroused the anger and opposition of the landowners. Among the people they say that the richer a man is the more greedy he is. And when you take away something from a greedy rich person, he is capable of anything ...You know quite well how people behave from whom you legally take away misappropriated land! In a word, in a number of areas the landowners, as a protest against the reform, stopped working and sowing the land. On the other hand many of the peasants who received land had no implements and no seed and no means of receiving either. There was no aid from the state. And the following picture resulted: the fellah had nothing to cultivate his land with, and he could not work as a labourer for the landowner; this sabotages the reform. Thus in the

agricultural year 1959-60 one quarter of all the land cultivated in the past was unsown."

In this situation, said Khalil Zayn, the main hope were the agricultural cooperatives. They visit one, and one of its members speaks of its experiences:

"How did we create this cooperative? We received strips, each of us 30 hectares of unirrigated land. And what were we to do with them? There were no machines, no seed. The landowner from whom we took these lands scoffed: 'Carry out your reform now.' We thought, we guessed, and we decided to unite. We sowed the wheat - and then we had a drought. The second year the same thing happened. Many did not last; out of 50 shareholders 27 remained."

Katin's article also gives the Soviet reader an insight into the more backward aspects of Syrian industry as well as Syrian agriculture. In Aleppo, he says, he visited a cotton-ginning factory whose owner proudly informed him that "everything is completely mechanized." When the mill-owner is called away to the telephone, a worker comes up and says he will show the visitors how "mechanized" the processes are. He takes them to a huge dark room at the back where little girls of five to seven, working eight or 10 hours a day, loosen and clean the cotton by hand.

Slow progress in Iraq PRAVDA's Baghdad correspondent P. Demchenko, in an article in SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK (No.1 of 1961), describes a visit to Abu Suq, a village in Iraq where the process of agricultural reform has been begun. Here, he says, the land was divided into two parts: on one part, divided into sections, peasants were working, but the other part, a vast field stretching to the horizon, still belonged to the landlord, and was lying fallow. Demchenko describes an interview with Ali Majid, the chairman of the local peasants union.

"The land on which the village was situated formerly belonged to the state, but a large part of the peasants worked as labourers for the feudal landowner. The labourer was nominally entitled to half the harvest, but in practice he received only 30 or 40 per cent. Soon after the law for agrarian reform part of the feudal landlord's land was taken from him and given to the village for general use. Later both the state portion and that taken from the landlord was divided among the peasants - about eight or 10 hectares for each family. In Ali Majid's opinion the peasants this year would receive two or three times as much income as when they worked as labourers, although productivity had not increased. This, I calculated mentally, means 40-50 dinars, or 1,200-1,400 rubles in comparable purchasing power.

On such an amount a family of five to eight persons had to live for a year - a difficult business, and to set up a farm was still more complicated.

"The growth of income was explained by Ali Majid by the fact that taxes and various payments now comprise not more than a fourth of the harvest. But the causes of the low productivity were clear even without any words from him. There were no fertilizers, machines or selected seed; the meaning of crop rotation was presented very vaguely to the peasants. The wooden hoe was the implement used in the fields, and at times a heavy stake with a piece sticking out at the end - things which long ago should have been in the museum.

"As everywhere in Iraq, there was no cooperative in the village. To a certain degree its functions are taken by the peasants' union. It organizes people for cleaning the irrigation canals and decides the questions of the joint purchase of seed, the sale of crops, etc. In the future, when the government creates machine stations, the union will be able to hire a tractor for ploughing or a thresher or a winnowing machine.

"'And how is the management of the union chosen?' I was interested in this. It seemed to me that this question somewhat embarrassed Ali Majid...He was collecting his thoughts. From what he said one gathered that the management was elected at a general meeting. But the union's chairman had been dismissed by the governor for 'concerning himself with what he ought not - politics'. In his place, until the holding of new elections, the governor had temporarily appointed Ali Majid, who had previously worked on the rural council. The union confines its activity purely to economic questions."

Demchenko then gives details of the agrarian reform law, pointing out that by September 1963, when the distribution of land must be completed, only a little more than a third of needy peasants will have received land. The question of how to deal with those without enough land, he says, is still in the air. It will be partially solved by the new irrigation systems on the Tigris and Euphrates; Soviet specialists have already chosen the most suitable sites for dams and canals, but many years will be needed for the implementation of these plans. Some peasants will be occupied in the state farms set up with Soviet aid, and others will be absorbed by the new industrial projects. "All this will make the problem less acute, but will not solve it completely." Nor has feudalism entirely disappeared:

"In Abu Suq the landowner kept 250 hectares of good irrigated land. After the revolution he did not appear here for a whole year, the peasants said. It is not known where he disappeared to, to Baghdad or abroad. Now he has begun to visit once again. This year he did not sow his field but left it lying fallow.

> Perhaps he has done this so that there will be less grain in the country; let the government know, he says, that they will not get along without the landowners. The peasants speak of the landowner with great hostility. But this is explained by the fact that some of them continue to depend on him. Some have not paid off old debts; others, as before, work for the former master; others have hired draught animals from him. Feudalism in Iraq has received a blow; it has been deprived of political power, but it has not disappeared from the scene."

THE SOVIET-PERSIAN TALKS OF 1958-9: THE SOVIET VERSION

In his recently published memoirs the Shah of Persia gives an account of the abortive negotiations between Persia and the Soviet Union in December 1958 - February 1959 for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. A reply to this is published by MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' (No.1 of 1961) in an article entitled "Restoring the Truth", by A. Irandust (a pseudonym, meaning "friend of Persia"). Irandust gives an account of the negotiations which considerably amplifies that given in the Soviet statement which was issued on their conclusion (PRAVDA 13.2.59 - MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.3 of 1959, pp.1-5 and appendix A).

At the outset Irandust repudiates three assertions made by the Shah. The Shah, he says, claims that the proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty came originally from the Soviet Union:

> "The exact opposite was the case. The Persian side pursued an insincere, double-dealing policy: negotiating a military agreement with the United States, it simultaneously proposed to the Soviet Union to conclude a new Soviet-Persian non-aggression treaty, and on 19th January 1959 even presented its draft."

Secondly, Irandust says, the Shah alleges that the Soviet Union insisted on Persia's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact as a condition for beginning the talks; but, he declares, "there is no basis for this statement".

Thirdly, the Shah says that during the talks the Soviet side continued to insist on Iran not concluding a bilateral agreement with the USA. But, says Irandust, "it was the Persian side, and not the Soviet side, which declared at the very start of the negotiations that Persia would sign no military agreement with the USA".

It may be asked what, in the Soviet view, was the Persian Government's aim in proposing the negotiation of a treaty which it had no in-

tention of signing. Irandust's view is that, in the first place, the Shah and his government were concerned at popular resentment against the proposed agreement with the USA, and wanted to pretend that it did not run counter to good relations with the USSR; and, in the second place, they wanted to use the Soviet-Persian talks as a means of diplomatic blackmail against the USA, in view of the delays in the signing of the Persian-US agreement.

The first stages of the negotiations The following is a summary of Irandust's account of the negotiations from 15th December to 27th January.

15.12.58 The Persian Foreign Minister Hekmat met the Soviet Ambassador Pegov and tried to convince him that the conclusion of a Persian-US military agreement was not directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. "To back this assertion, Hekmat said that he would like (at first unofficially) to suggest an examination of the possibility of the Soviet Union and Persia concluding a 20-year non-aggression treaty. Hekmat was told that the USSR was prepared to display good will and facilitate the removal of the causes for Persia's apprehensions, if such really existed, so that Persia should give up the intention of concluding a military agreement with the USA...It should also be borne in mind that there are operating treaties between the USSR and Persia which conform to the security interests of both countries and promote the preservation of Persia's independence." (The reference here is to the Soviet-Persian treaties of 1921 and 1927.) Hekmat asked Pegov to draw up an aide-memoire for the Shah on the questions touched on in the conversation.

21.12.58 The Soviet Ambassador saw Hekmat and read him the aide-memoire. It stated that the Soviet Government was not against considering the non-aggression treaty, having in view that the Persian Government would not enter into any military agreement with the USA or any other country and would not assume any military commitments with regard to third countries which would run counter to the purpose of a Soviet-Persian non-aggression treaty. Hekmat asked that mention of a non-aggression treaty should be omitted from the official text of the aide-memoire presented to the Shah; he had raised the matter unofficially, to learn the Soviet attitude, and the official proposal could now come from the Persian side.

28.12.58 The Soviet Ambassador officially handed the aide-memoire to Hekmat.

15.1.59 "The Persian side stated that the Shah of Persia expressed a wish to conduct confidential negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador through some high-ranking Soviet leaders concerning a Soviet-Persian non-aggression treaty."

19.1.59 Hekmat presented to the Soviet Ambassador a Persian draft of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression. Asked whether, in the event of the treaty being concluded, Persia would refrain from signing a military treaty with the USA or any third country, and from assuming military commitments with regard to third countries, Hekmat replied in the affirmative. On the Baghdad Pact, "Hekmat said that 'if a new stage in Persia's relations with the Soviet Union begins, the Baghdad Pact will cease to exist'."

23.1.59 The Soviet side informed Hekmat that the Soviet Government viewed favourably the idea of concluding a treaty, but naturally time was needed to study the transmitted text. Hekmat agreed, but said that procrastination was likewise undesirable. "He pointed out that after the Soviet-Persian treaty was signed he would exert efforts to keep Turkey and Pakistan from signing bilateral agreements with the USA." Later in the day the Soviet Ambassador was informed of the Shah's gratification at Moscow's favourable reception of the proposal. "But at the same time he was informed of the Shah's request to expedite an answer on the substance of the matter so as to sign or initial 'at least the basic articles of a non-aggression treaty' prior to 27th January (the day when a session of the Baghdad Pact Council was to open in Karachi). Moreover, it was added that in the event of a favourable settlement of the question...Persia would refuse to sign a treaty with the USA, which the Persian delegation allegedly intended to announce at the Karachi session."

27.1.59 At another meeting with Hekmat the Soviet side expressed perplexity as to why the Persian side linked the desire to initial the treaty with the date of the Karachi session. The Soviet side would like to discuss the question seriously so as better to prepare the corresponding treaty, and suggested that either a Persian delegation should visit Moscow or a Soviet delegation should go to Tehran. Hekmat said that, if the treaty were swiftly signed or initialled, Persia could confront its Baghdad Pact allies and the USA with a fait accompli. He asked if the Soviet delegation could come to Tehran on 28th January. Later in the day the Ambassador was informed that the Shah expected the Soviet delegation to arrive in Tehran on 28th January and to start talks the next day. He asked for the sake of secrecy that the delegation should be as small as possible.

The question of the 1921 Treaty At this point in his account Irandust comes to the question of the annulment of Articles 5 and 6 of the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921. (By Article 5 of the Treaty the two parties undertook to prevent the presence on their territories of forces "whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia". Article 6 of the Treaty gave Russia the right to advance troops into Persia if a third party should use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia; but an exchange of letters annexed to the treaty made it clear that the specific situation envisaged by

this article was the use of Persian territory by Tsarist counter-revolutionary forces or their allies.)

The Persian draft of the proposed new non-aggression treaty, as given in Irandust's article, refers to Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty as having been "formulated in the special conditions prevailing at the moment when the Treaty was concluded", and as "no longer corresponding to present conditions". The Persians, Irandust says, claim that the Soviet Government "from the very outset" accepted the annulment of these articles. "In reality, however, the Soviet Government already on 21st December had clearly formulated its position, namely that the 1921 Treaty was an operating agreement conforming to the security interests of both countries and promoting the preservation of Persia's independence." The Soviet draft of the proposed non-aggression treaty made no mention of Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty, "and this signified that the given question remained open".

The breakdown of the negotiations The following is a summary of Irandust's account of the negotiations from the time of the Soviet delegation's arrival in Tehran.

30.1.59 The Soviet delegation was received by the Shah. The Shah said that he wanted to improve Soviet-Persian relations, and that not a single foreign military base would be set up in Persian territory. By renouncing Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty, he said, the USSR would neither lose nor sacrifice anything. The Soviet delegation said it was struck by the fact that this point was being insisted on just when negotiations for a US-Persian agreement were in progress; "surely you do not want to be relieved of obligations under operating treaties with the USSR in order to set up afterwards foreign military bases in Persian territory and to admit into Persia forces of third states which might threaten the security of the Soviet Union?" The Shah said that the treaty articles were out of date, since they had been adopted at a time when "White Guards were operating against the Soviet Union and the situation was different". The Soviet side said that, if in fact annulment of the articles was not aimed at establishing a US anti-Soviet bridgehead in Persia, the question could be deferred for later consideration.

31.1.59 An official meeting of the Soviet and Persian delegations was held. "Hekmat...tried to impart a tinge of ultimatum to the proposal on the annulment of Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty. He said outright that acceptance of this proposal was a preliminary condition for the continuation of the talks...His statement contained unilateral assertions about the above-mentioned articles being 'null and void' and levelled impermissible charges of 'aggression' against the Soviet Government in connection with the entry of Soviet troops into Persian territory in 1941, effected in conformity with Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty. In view of this the Soviet delegation rejected this statement, characterizing it

as inacceptable both in form and content."

2.2.59 After a luncheon in honour of the Soviet delegation Hekmat said that his statement of 31st January was not an official document and that unnecessary sharpness had been introduced into it by wrong translation; he expressed his apologies, and hoped that everything would be settled. But he subsequently emphasized that Soviet consent to annulment of the 1921 articles was a prerequisite for continuation of the talks. In reply the Soviet delegation expressed its general misgivings about the Persian aims, especially in view of the continuing Persian talks with the USA.

3.2.59 The Soviet delegation was received by the Shah and made a verbal statement. It said that, in view of the significance which the Persian Government and the Shah personally attached to Article 6, and of the arguments adduced by the Shah, Khrushchev had asked the delegation to declare that the USSR wished to lay a solid basis for friendly relations and confidence between the two countries; accordingly the Soviet Government agreed to discuss the question of Article 6. It would like to know in what form, in the opinion of the Persian side, the question of Article 6 should be settled, and would like "to receive from it a formula of a corresponding provision in the treaty which would provide the necessary guarantee of security for the Soviet Union". In settling such a big question it would be well if the two sides would meet each other half way. "Withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact would constitute such a step on the part of Persia. The Baghdad Pact...has led to inimical and exacerbated relations between the USSR and Persia...At present, however, if both sides display sufficient good will, it is possible, taking into account the interests of both sides, to achieve positive results in consolidating friendly and good-neighbourly relations between both countries."

Early in February, says Irandust, there were many signs that the Persian side had decided to end the talks and had given commitments to other Baghdad Pact members to do so. "In these conditions the Soviet side, desiring to avoid the loss of the slightest chance to improve Soviet-Persian relations and striving to ascertain the real attitude of the Shah and the Persian Government to the conclusion of a treaty between the two countries, deemed it necessary to take one more step toward the Persian side."

6.2.59 The Soviet delegation had another meeting with the Shah and presented him with a statement. This said that the Soviet Government, desirous to do everything possible to establish genuinely friendly and good-neighbourly relations, had decided to take another step towards meeting the Persian Government's wishes: it accepted fully the draft treaty as proposed by the Persian side, and empowered the delegation to sign it at once. In so doing it naturally expected the Persian Government and the Shah to take corresponding steps to strengthen confidence

between the two countries and to safeguard in equal measure the security of both. "The Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that in view of the signing of this treaty the Persian Government will assume the obligation not to conclude bilateral agreements with any third states directed against the Soviet Union...(and will) confirm the obligation, voiced by the Shah, that it will not offer its territory for the establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing, on any pretext, of foreign troops in its territory." The Soviet Government did not insist on Persia's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.

10.2.59 The Soviet delegation had an official meeting with the Persian delegation. "Hekmat presented...new, obviously inacceptable terms which ran counter to everything the Persian side had stated in the course of the negotiations." He said that his government was not prepared to sign the Persian draft of the treaty unless it was clearly added to the text that it did not run counter to Persia's obligations under its "defensive treaties". Whether or not the Soviet Union accepted this, Persia intended to sign a military agreement with the USA conforming to Persia's membership of the Baghdad Pact. The Persian Government was ready to agree not to permit the organization of foreign military bases in its territory, provided that a committee of specialists determined what was involved in the concept of "military bases". He "gave a quite evasive answer" (a) to the Soviet proposal that both sides undertake not to conclude treaties with third parties directed against one or other of the contracting parties, and (b) to the Soviet question whether Persia agreed that "under no pretext" would it allow foreign troops on its territory.

> "After the Soviet delegation had presented a number of questions and finally clarified the position of the Persian side, depriving it of a chance to claim that the Soviet side refused to continue the talks because of disagreement on some item, a recess was called at the request of the Soviet delegation. Then the Soviet delegation made a statement, the text of which was published in the Soviet press." (See MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.3 of 1959, appendix A)

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on Middle East events appearing in Soviet newspapers during the period 31st January - 24th February.

UAR The third anniversary of the UAR was the subject of special articles in the Soviet press. PRAVDA (21.2.61) marked the anniversary with a long article by Prof. I. Komzin on the progress of work on the

Aswan High Dam. An unsigned article in IZVESTIYA (23.2.61) referred to Soviet-UAR economic cooperation and, at greater length, to the agreement of Soviet and UAR views on colonialism, the Congo and Africa in general.

TRUD (5.2.61) gave an account of a DAILY WORKER item of 3rd February on the fate of political prisoners in the UAR. This, said TRUD, was an appeal to the progressive public of the world to aid the 370 political prisoners in Egyptian concentration camps; it had been secretly smuggled out of Egypt. It gave the names of some of those who had been killed in the camps. Particularly brutal treatment, it said, had been given to a group of prisoners brought to Abu Zabal on 28th November 1959; one of them, Dr. Farid Haddad, was beaten to death. Another group of 45 prisoners was similarly treated; when they asked one of them, Shuhdi Atiyah, whether he was a Communist, and he answered yes, they beat him to death. The appeal asked that a public protest should be made "to end this bloody slaughter".

Iraq The proceedings and resolutions of the Arab League Council meeting in Baghdad were briefly reported in the Soviet press. PRAVDA's correspondent Demchenko reported (6.2.61) a mass demonstration in Baghdad which called on the Arab Foreign Ministers to adopt firm decisions on the questions of Algeria, Oman, Zionism and foreign bases in Arab countries.

For reports of Soviet and other protests to Qasim on the treatment of "trade unionists, patriots and democrats" in Iraq, see the first article in this issue.

Turkey PRAVDA (7.2.61) reported that on 3rd February the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, N.S. Ryzhov, handed to the Turkish Foreign Minister a Soviet Government statement about reports on the construction of rocket bases in Turkey. This quoted Turkish press reports to the effect that the recent Paris session of the NATO Council decided to equip the Turkish armed forces with "Jupiter" rockets; that a US firm was building rocket bases in Turkey with the assistance of US military specialists; that in December 1960 a group of senators, representatives of the US Atomic Energy Commission, had visited Turkey in connection with the handing over of nuclear weapons to Turkey and the selection of rocket launching sites; and that under an agreement with the former Turkish Government, Turkish personnel to service the rocket bases had been sent to the USA for training. Reports on the building of missile bases in direct proximity to the borders of the USSR were understandably a matter of concern to the Soviet Government, the statement went on; and it recalled a Soviet statement of 28th April 1959 about the construction of missile bases in Turkish territory, and also the flight of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft from Incirlik airfield, which "showed that, using the bases granted them in Turkish territory, foreign military circles threaten the

security of the USSR and other countries bordering on Turkey, as well as Turkey itself". The new leaders of Turkey had declared their intention to revive the Turkish-Soviet friendship of the time of Ataturk; the Soviet Government for its part, striving for good-neighbourly relations, hoped that the Turkish leaders would not let their country be drawn into dangerous ventures which threatened peace. The Soviet Government would be grateful to the Turkish Government for an explanation whether the Turkish press reports on the construction of NATO rocket bases on Turkish territory were correct.

In an article on the Yassiada trials (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 28.1.61) N. Matus sought to present the trials as an indictment of US relations with Turkey. Most of the article was a denunciation of US military aid to Turkey and of Turkey's own military expenditure and its economic repercussions, as if this were an issue in the trials. On the disclosures regarding the anti-Greek riots of September 1955, Matus said that Menderes had admitted US complicity in his government's attempt to cover them up; it appeared that Mr. Allen Dulles, who had been in Turkey at the time, had advised Bayar to claim that the riots had been instigated by Communists. It had also been revealed that the bomb exploded in the Turkish Consulate in Salonika - which was the pretext for the riots - was of American manufacture. Washington, said Matus, was seriously worried at the course the trials were taking, and was applying pressure to the Turkish Government to end them as soon as possible.

A protocol on the lists of goods for mutual deliveries between the USSR and Turkey in 1961 was signed in Moscow on 16th February (PRAVDA 17.2.61). Turkey will export to the USSR traditional export goods, including wool, cotton, hides, tobacco, citrus fruits, dried fruits and tanning agents. The Soviet Union will export to Turkey various kinds of machinery and equipment, including electro-technical equipment, metal-working lathes, motor vehicles, farm machinery, metals, chemicals, timber, cellulose, paper, glass and other goods.

IZVESTIYA (24.2.61) published an editorial comment on the trade protocol. The delegation led by Mazlum Ataman, it said, had been the first Turkish Government trade delegation to visit the Soviet Union since the war. The volume of Soviet-Turkish trade in 1961 would be considerably greater than in 1960; however, the possibilities for a wider exchange of goods were far from exhausted. Under Ataturk trade between the two countries had reached considerable proportions. Unfortunately this trade was reduced at the outbreak of the Second World War, and after it ceased altogether; trading operations between Soviet organizations and Turkish firms were only resumed in 1953. Soviet participation in the Izmir Fair, and the visit of a delegation of Turkish businessmen to the USSR at the end of last year, had enabled Turkish business circles to appreciate the export and import possibilities of the Soviet Union. In the restoration of Soviet-Turkish trade relations the Soviet public saw a concrete expression of Gen. Gursel's desire to improve Soviet-Turkish relations.

SOVIET WRITING ON THE SUDAN

Three Soviet writers have made a special study of the Sudan. S.R. Smirnov, now head of the Sector of History in the Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute, writes on history and ethnography; his works include THE MAHDIST RISING IN THE SUDAN, Moscow 1950, and "Formation and Ways of Development of the North Sudanese People" in AFRICAN ETHNOGRAPHIC SYMPOSIUM I, Moscow 1956, together with articles (SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.6 of 1958 and VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR No.1 of 1959) on his visit to the Sudan in 1958. Yu.D. Dmitrevskiy writes on economic geography, and published THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN, Moscow 1951, and a revised version called THE SUDAN in 1959 (referred to in this article as "Dmitrevskiy"). V.I. Kiselev has written on the national liberation movement in "The National Liberation Movement in the Sudan after the Second World War" (SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE No.5 of 1956) and THE SUDAN's PATH TO INDEPENDENCE, Moscow 1958 (referred to as "Kiselev"). Events since independence have so far been covered mainly by journalists.

The Sudan in the 19th century In AFRICAN ETHNOGRAPHIC SYMPOSIUM I, Moscow 1956, S.R. Smirnov, after recounting the history of the Northern Sudan from the earliest times and describing the states of Sennar and Darfur in detail, writes that at the beginning of the 19th century "the independent historical development of the peoples of the Eastern Sudan was interrupted" by the Egyptian conquest. Both Smirnov and Dmitrevskiy describe the suffering which Egyptian rule brought to the peoples of the Sudan, particularly from the slave trade and taxes in money and kind. Nevertheless Dmitrevskiy asserts that "the grievous position of the broad masses took a sharp turn for the worse from the time of the appearance in the Sudan of the first European colonialists". Smirnov (op.cit.) says that the first Europeans were in search of easy profit and "took the most active part in the slave trade". In 1857, he continues, the ruler of Egypt officially banned the slave trade because the slave traders were acting too independently and also because of pressure from European powers who had realised that it was more profitable to exploit Africans in Africa and cover up their seizure of territories with anti-slavery slogans. However, he says, the slave trade continued to flourish because the Egyptian administration in the Sudan was corrupt. V.I. Kiselev tends to gloss over the evils of the Egyptian administration and concentrates on the activities of the Europeans. By the 1870s, he says, when Britain had established control over Egypt, she "prepared for the seizure of the Sudan" which she regarded as "a profitable strategic base for dominating the other countries of the Nile valley, particularly Egypt, and as a springboard for penetration into the central darkest regions of Africa with their inexhaustible supplies of raw material and cheap labour". Britain used her influence in Egypt to secure the appointments to the Sudan of Baker and Gordon, "the butcher of the Taipin revolt in China", who with the various European provincial governors were nominally in Egyptian service but in fact "served the interests of Britain". On the

pretext of fighting the slave trade military expeditions were organised to the south which spread British influence there. "Already by the end of the 1870s", Kiselev concludes, "the Sudan only nominally belonged to Egypt."

The Mahdiyah Smirnov (op.cit.) expresses the generally held Soviet view of the Mahdist rising in the following words: "The intolerable tax burden, the arbitrariness of the Turkish-Egyptian officials and the colonial order of the British type aroused the mass indignation of the peasants and nomads which grew in 1881 into an openly anti-feudal, anti-imperialist rising which took on a religious colouring." Smirnov states that Britain's policy at this time, which Gordon was carrying out, "amounted to tearing the Sudan away from Egypt". The British thought they could not only suppress the rising but also organize in the Sudan an independent sultanate "headed by a puppet pro-British government". The southern part of the Sudan was to be joined to Britain's East African colonies. Dmitrevskiy describes Gordon's activity on his return to the Sudan in 1884 as a "clear illustration of the unscrupulousness in achieving their aims so characteristic of the British colonialists"; he proclaimed the Sudan an "independent" state, sanctioned slave-owing and tried to bribe the Mahdi but with no success.

Dmitrevskiy rejects the conclusions of "bourgeois" historians who claim that the Mahdist state brought the country nothing but devastation and destruction, and says that a cursory study is enough to come to different conclusions. Firstly, not all the Mahdist leaders were slave-traders. Secondly, it was a highly centralized state. Moreover the export of slaves almost ceased. Dmitrevskiy queries the figures given by British writers for the decrease of the population under Mahdist rule from 8/8½ million to 1½/2 million and says the figures are nearer 4/4½ million and 2/2½ million. Nevertheless he admits that there were popular revolts against the government, caused by the "numerous negative aspects of the policy of the Mahdists". Promises of equality for all were forgotten, and the Mahdist leaders grew rich by exploiting the masses. Further, the nomadic tribes were particularly favoured. This process is regarded as "historically inevitable" by Soviet writers and Kiselev explains it by saying that "Mahdism, being basically a peasant movement, could not destroy the feudal means of production prevailing in the Sudan". The resulting "internal contradictions" were "one of the main reasons for the downfall of the Mahdist state". Another was the rivalry between Britain and France to the south of the Sudan which led Britain hurriedly to organize a military campaign against the Mahdists in 1896. "True to her traditions of making someone else draw the chestnuts out of the fire", says Dmitrevskiy, "Britain forced Egyptian troops to take part in the campaign."

In dealing with this period in the section on the Sudan in THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRIES OF NON-SOVIET ASIA AND AFRICA FROM 1800 TO 1917,

Leningrad 1959, A.M. Goldobin suggests that Arabi Pasha and his anti-imperialist nationalist party which were in power in Egypt in 1882 should have joined forces with the Mahdists "against the colonialists and Turkish feudal lords"; but unfortunately, he says, Arabi Pasha's party "was not free from the influence of the Great Power tradition of Muhammad Ali and Isma'il in the Sudan question, and still looked on the Sudanese as subject 'savages'" while the Mahdists "looked on any Cairo authorities as oppressors". Goldobin claims that it was not the resurgence of feudalism but the war with Ethiopia which played "the most fateful role" in weakening the Mahdist state. He says that the heavy losses in the fratricidal war between the Ethiopians and the Sudanese, "provoked by the British", meant that the Mahdists could put few men in the field for the campaign against Egypt.

The Condominium Dmitrevskiy says that the Convention of 1899 establishing the Anglo-Egyptian condominium over the Sudan "was a very convenient way of turning the country into a British colony". By "returning" the territory to Egypt the encroachments of other European countries on various parts of the country were rejected; part of the financial burden was placed on Egypt; and the military occupation regime gave Britain complete freedom of action. According to Kiselev "the false condominium over the Sudan embodied that refined hypocrisy which, according to Lenin, was always an inalienable characteristic of the policy of British imperialism".

Dmitrevskiy states that the "pacification" of the Sudan lasted until 1916, and lists numerous revolts and disturbances "suppressed with extraordinary cruelty" which show that "dissatisfaction with the regime established by the British embraced the whole country". From the first Britain tried to get the local leaders on her side at the expense of the masses. The slave trade was in fact largely abolished but not for altruistic reasons; slavery was, however, maintained. The tax system showed the favoured treatment accorded to the feudal chiefs: "a characteristic touch" says Dmitrevskiy, "was that in establishing the tax system the British abolished the existing high tax on water-wheels which were owned as a rule by the richest Sudanese". In the 1920s Britain changed to a system of indirect rule in the Sudan which necessitated recreating the necessary tribal system where it had been destroyed. According to Dmitrevskiy Britain had four reasons for doing this: "(a) to give the appearance of self-government; (b) to put at the head of the latter the most reactionary elements the tribal nobility...; (c) to facilitate her operations in exploiting the country (collection of taxes, public works, etc.)...; (d) to reduce expenditure on administration". Smirnov, in PEOPLES OF AFRICA, Moscow 1954, says the organization of advisory commitees in the provinces of the Northern Sudan in 1937 and the establishment of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan in 1944 were part of the same process. "The British imperialists", he says, "demagogically presented these 'reforms' as the introduction of local "democratic" self-

government which they said would serve as a training school for the self-government of the Sudan. In fact this policy is aimed at strengthening and perpetuating the colonial position of the Sudan."

The Sudan had a twofold importance for Britain, according to Kiselev. "For more than half a century British ruling circles used its territory to maintain their colonial domination over the other countries of the Nile valley, and above all Egypt" and "the Sudan was an object of expansion for British financial capital". The British, he says, seized the best land, at first openly and then through legal devices, so that by 1950 about 90 per cent of all land suitable for cultivation was in the hands of the colonial administration and various companies connected with it; they seized the water resources which gave them a means of control over the agricultural producers; they seized key positions in the Sudanese economy - in agriculture, home and foreign trade, industry, the credit system and transport; they turned the Sudan into a one-crop (cotton) country to the detriment of grain crops, which resulted in famines; the population were burdened with ever-increasing taxes and suffered under bad working conditions; there was forced labour in the south; virtually no medical services were provided to cope with diseases, which grew more widespread due to malnutrition and poor living conditions; the British set the south against the north and regarded the Africans as an inferior race; and the vast majority of Africans were deprived of the chance to receive an education.

The economy under British rule In his book THE SUDAN Dmitrevskiy devotes over 130 pages to a description of the Sudan's economy under the headings "General Description", "Industry", "Agriculture", "Transport" and "Economic Regions". In general, he says, the economy under British rule can be described as "typically colonial", that is "British capital in the Sudan expropriated land, water and mineral wealth, set up large agricultural undertakings of the colonial type with an export orientation and seized the country's communications and its trade and industry". British capital radically disrupted local handicrafts but did not provide a modern manufacturing industry in their place.

Dmitrevskiy denounces the Gezira cotton scheme. He says that it turned the Sudan into "a raw material appendage of Great Britain" and "was a system of exploitation of Sudanese tenant farmers and seasonal workers by foreign, primarily British, capital". The rules of cultivation "deprived the tenants of any independence", and the tenant relations were "of a semi-feudal nature". The tenants were always in debt, and from the beginning had protested against their exploitation. Specialization in cotton had led to catastrophic results for the Sudan's economy during world economic crises, and foodstuffs now had to be imported.

On the other hand the Soviet journalist Yuri Bochkarev, who visited

the Gezira in 1958, said that the scheme "is in fact the backbone of the Sudan's economy", and did not suggest that it should be otherwise. He says that in 1950 "the growing national liberation movement compelled the British to yield to the Sudanese demands for the nationalization of the Gezira scheme", which now "is no longer a source of profit to alien parasites". In general Bochkarev gives a favourable account of the management and organization of the Gezira scheme, both as an economic and as a social project.

Dmitrevskiy claims that the Sudanese transport system showed clearly Britain's "exploiting" policy. Railways, he says, were only built to assist the exploitation of the country, and the fact that there was no railway between Aswan and Wadi Halfa was because of the British desire to isolate the Sudan both politically and economically from Egypt; and for similar reasons there was no railway between the north and south of the Sudan. Further Dmitrevskiy alleges that if the British had wanted to they could have solved the navigation problems of the Nile cataracts by building locks and simultaneously providing electricity and irrigation, but "the cataracts proved to be involuntary allies of the British colonialists, hindering communication by water between the Sudan and Egypt and strengthening the monopoly position of the railways".

The Independence Movement Kiselev divides the independence movement into three stages. The first is from the 1880s to the 1914-1918 war, when "the Sudanese anti-colonial movement (including the Mahdist rising) had primarily a spontaneous nature" and was mainly conducted "under religious slogans". The second, from 1914 to 1939, was when the first national organizations were set up, such as the Sudanese United Tribes Society and the White Flag League, headed by the bourgeois intelligentsia. However, these organizations "had a narrow social base", "did not embrace the broad popular masses" and were still under "the powerful influence of Muslim religious slogans". The third period from the Second World War is marked by "the participation of the broad popular masses", when organized actions - strikes, demonstrations and boycotts - take the place of spontaneous outbreaks of dissatisfaction and "local interests... give place to general national interests".

Kiselev says that from the 1920s the national-liberation movement was under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie. But "as the organization and political activity of the Sudanese proletariat grew, particularly after the Second World War, its role in this movement increased". Often it was "the vanguard of the anti-imperialist forces" and "the leader of political campaigns aimed at rallying all the patriotic progressive forces of the Sudan". However, Kiselev notes, in the then social and economic conditions the national bourgeoisie by virtue of its greater political experience managed to keep its predominant influence among the masses whose desire for independence it shared.

Two organizations to which Kiselev attributes an important role in the struggle for independence are the illegal Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (SMNL) and the Trade Union Federation of the Sudan. The formation of the SMNL at the end of 1948 by "representatives of the working class and progressive intelligentsia" is described by Kiselev as an event of "great importance for the whole subsequent development of the national liberation movement... Acquainting the Sudanese with Marxism-Leninism and with the experience of the struggle of the working class in other countries, the SMNL did much to further the growth of the class consciousness of the Sudanese workers and rouse the popular masses of the country in the struggle for national liberation." After describing the beginnings of the trade union movement in the Sudan, Kiselev says that "under the leadership of the trade unions and the SMNL the Sudanese workers took part in several major strikes in the years 1948-1951". Important achievements were the revision of the 1948 labour legislation aimed at keeping the labour movement split up and the establishment of the Trade Union Federation of the Sudan in November 1950. Kiselev claims that in the 1950s "the first peasant organizations were set up with the aid of the SMNL and the Trade Union Federation" and calls the Second Congress of the Sudanese Trade Unions which took place in December 1951 "a major event in the political life of the country". It defined the political tasks of the trade unions, declared their support for WFTU and unmasked ICFTU attempts to isolate them from WFTU.

In 1951, Kiselev says, the SMNL showed the initiative in uniting all national forces of the country in a single anti-imperialist front, the National Front of Struggle for the Liberation of the Sudan, which united all except the pro-British parties. After the trade union congress the National Front and the trade unions decided to set up a new organization on the basis of the National Front, called the United Front of Struggle for the Liberation of the Sudan. Kiselev says this was "a bloc of various patriotic parties and organizations" and "played an important role in mobilizing and rallying the national forces of the Sudan in the independence struggle". Kiselev tells of the formation in 1953 of a "new legal democratic party" called the Anti-Imperialist Front which united "the most active and consistent participants of the fight for the liberation of the Sudan". He notes that the Anti-Imperialist Front gained only one seat in the 1953 elections, and that it was the only party excluded from the commission for drafting the constitution, but offers no explanation for this.

Against the independence movement, says Kiselev, Britain employed twofold tactics. The first was the method of "'divide and rule', in every way inflaming inter-nation (mezhnatsional'nyy) and interreligious discord in the country and artificially aggravating the contradictions between various political parties and trends and between the Sudan and Egypt". The second was "nominal reforms". The various constitutional reforms were basically a continuation of the system of indirect rule introduced in the 1920s whereby, by letting the feudal-clan nobility

participate in the government of the country, Britain thought she could more closely attach them to herself. For a time, Kiselev states, these tactics combined with "colonial repressions" were successful. Eventually, however, the British Government "was forced to abandon the colonial regime and recognize the independence of the Sudan".

The Sudan and Egypt Kiselev says that the national liberation movement in the Sudan was weakened by disagreement among the national bourgeoisie about the Sudan's relationship with Egypt. The Soviet view on this matter has not been altogether consistent.

When Egypt's demand for the unification of the Sudan with Egypt was discussed in the UN Security Council in 1947, the Soviet representative expressed the view that the Sudanese people's opinion must be known first. On the other hand, of the two main political parties in the Sudan Soviet writers always expressed support for the pro-Egyptian Ashigga - not because it was pro-Egyptian, but because it was anti-British and also "closer to the people". Smirnov (PEOPLES OF AFRICA, 1954) noted that the Ashigga stood for unification of the Sudan with Egypt, but made no comment on the rights or wrongs of such a policy. By 1956 Smirnov, writing in AFRICAN ETHNOGRAPHIC SYMPOSIUM I, was not even admitting that this was Ashigga policy. He merely states that in 1948 the Ashigga Party "considered that the success of the national liberation movement of the Sudanese peoples depended on the joint struggle of the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples", and that its programme called for "the proclamation of the Sudan's independence".

Kiselev, wise after the event, declares that "progressive forces in the Sudan" and "the democratic forces of Egypt" always saw in the slogan "Unity of the Nile Valley" "first and foremost a joint fight with the Egyptians against the common enemy, British imperialism" but not necessarily the union of the two countries in one state. However, the slogan "was not sufficiently concrete". "Feudal-monarchic circles of Egypt", he continues, understood it to imply the state unity of the two countries. This "virtually poured water on the mill of the British imperialists" who "represented the narrow self-interested aims of the then feudal-monarchic rulers of Egypt as the desire of Egypt to 'swallow' the Sudan". Al-Azhari, says Kiselev, succumbed to Egyptian pressure on this question when he was in Cairo in 1946. While Kiselev acclaims Egypt's denunciation of the 1936 treaty and 1899 Convention in 1951, he says the laws passed at the same time proclaiming Faruq King of Egypt and the Sudan "trampled on the lawful right of the Sudanese people to self-determination". However, all was changed in 1952 when Faruq was overthrown and the new government which came to power in Egypt agreed to self-determination for the Sudan. Kiselev charges Britain with bad faith after the signing of the 1953 agreement, but makes no mention of charges against Egypt of interference in the election campaign.

It is interesting to note that, unlike Kiselev, Dr. I.I. Potekhin apparently does not ascribe Egyptian ambitions in the Sudan only to the former "feudal-monarchic" circles. In describing the same period (SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE No.1 of 1956) he writes that "these three years were full of tense political struggle. Britain tried to keep the Sudan within the framework of the Empire. Egyptian ruling circles insisted on the unification of the whole Nile valley in a single state."

North and South Soviet writers allege that the British deliberately sought to intensify differences between the northern and southern Sudanese peoples. But they themselves, so far from claiming that the Sudanese are, or could be, a single homogeneous national unit, have emphasized the differences between north and south and discussed the possibilities of the formation, not of a united Sudanese nation, but of separate nations in the north and in the south.

Potekhin (SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.4 of 1957) says that the Sudanese Government will need "a lot of political wisdom and tact to establish relations of peaceful collaboration between the peoples of north and south". The Arab population of the north is more advanced, while the Nilotes in the south "belong to one of the most backward peoples of Africa". This results in government officials and army officers in the south being mostly Arabs and "in a society divided into antagonistic classes creates a complicated situation". Potekhin says that Nilote tribal chiefs "incited by imperialist agents" try to oppose the south to the north, as was shown by the revolt in the south on the eve of independence.

Smirnov in AFRICAN ETHNOGRAPHIC SYMPOSIUM I traces the formation of what he calls the North Sudanese people. He says that the Egyptian conquest, the resultant development of the slave trade and the Mahdi rising played a big part in consolidating the peoples and tribes of the Northern Sudan through the wide-scale movements of population, a more general use of Arabic and further class stratification of society. Despite the efforts of the British to preserve feudalism, they could not prevent the development of capitalism with the emergence of a national bourgeoisie and working class. The growth of the towns, the further spread of Arabic and the mass movement of seasonal workers had resulted in further consolidation; history had "created all the necessary prerequisites" for the transformation of the northern Sudanese people into a nation. In SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.6 of 1958 Smirnov says that his visit to the Sudan earlier that year had confirmed that this was happening and that the process was "near to completion". Of the Nilotes Potekhin says in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.4 of 1957 that they have not been studied "but it is not completely excluded that under favourable conditions the Nilotes could form a single people".

The Sudan since independence Soviet accounts of the Sudan since independence stress the enormous problems facing the country in eliminating the consequences of "the colonial regime". Kiselev notes that though independence meant the transfer to the state of important property of the colonial regime - factories, irrigation systems, the railways and land - resulting in "an important state-capitalist sector in the Sudanese economy", British trading companies still hold strong positions, particularly in cotton. Like other Soviet writers Kiselev writes approvingly of the broad outlines of the Sudanese five-year plan aimed at diversifying the economy, enlarging the irrigation system, establishing a power base and encouraging local industry, but he stresses the lack of national capital.

Soviet writers have spoken approvingly of the Sudan's foreign policy since independence. Thus G. Yur'yev, in an article on the second anniversary of the Sudan's independence (SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK No.1 of 1958), claims that the Sudan's rejection of aid with strings, its rejection of the Eisenhower doctrine and its support for the principles of Bandung and the liberation struggle of the Arab countries and peoples of the whole world "raise the role and prestige of the Sudan in international affairs" and have earned it "the recognition of all peace-loving countries". More recently, however, Soviet commentators have expressed the view that Sudanese foreign policy only became genuinely neutral under Gen. Abbud (see below).

Some critical remarks appeared in a series of articles by S. Kondrashov entitled "The Sudan at the Beginning of the Road" in SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK Nos.8, 10 and 11 of 1958. Kondrashov was very sarcastic about Sudanese officials who ape their British predecessors with their khaki shorts and pith helmets, their refusal to discuss politics, their cricket and their morning reading of The Times ("interested persons take very good care to see the British papers are delivered to the Sudan as speedily as possible") and said the people call them "black Englishmen". Kondrashov alleged that Britain was threatening to destroy the Gezira by reducing her cotton purchases drastically in 1957, and appeals to the British Government had been of no avail since the latter had replied that trade was in private hands. The Sudanese had expressed a preference for private trading; but surely, said Kondrashov, their own experience showed "that it is dangerous to entrust the fate of the country's economy and the people's well-being into unreliable 'private hands!". They must turn to the East as well, he concluded, and "get more profit out of being a neutral state". He also noted that, although the government's official policy was positive neutrality, the Umma Party ministers in particular were pro-Western.

It may be noted that, in contrast with other Soviet writers who have either ignored or played down the influence of the Sudanese religious sects, Kondrashov asserted that "they have such a big influence on the Sudan's political life that it is simply impossible to understand it

without taking this influence into account". Such a remark, which to a non-Communist observer of Sudanese affairs is self-evident, represents a substantial concession to reality on the part of a Soviet writer. In the official Soviet view, Islam is not in itself a force but an instrument in the hands of reactionary forces. However, Kondrashov occasionally permits himself an unorthodox observation of this kind (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.11 of 1960, p.4).

Soviet-Sudanese relations To judge by recent Soviet newspaper articles and reports, it is now the Soviet aim to find as broad a basis as possible for Soviet-Sudanese rapprochement. On 17th November 1960, the second anniversary of Gen. Abbud's assumption of power, PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA both published long articles expressing approval of the policy of Gen. Abbud's government. PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent I. Belyayev said that under Gen. Abbud's government "for the first time in the Sudan's history its policy was worked out not in London but in Khartoum, and not by foreigners but by the Sudanese themselves". In internal affairs, cotton-growing and irrigation were developing successfully, national industry was being encouraged, national banks were being set up and the Sudanization of the educational system and civil service was being carried out. In foreign affairs, the Sudan had rejected foreign military pacts and bases, signed agreements regulating issues with the UAR, and concluded trade agreements with the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union.

IZVESTIYA's article on the anniversary, "The Republic of the Sudan is on the Right Course", was by V.I. Kiselev. The previous government of Abdullah Khalil, said Kiselev, had accepted US aid, opposed economic relations with the socialist countries and rapprochement with Egypt and, while pretending to pursue a policy of neutrality, had in fact "revolved in the orbit of the Anglo-American bloc". Gen. Abbud's government, on the other hand, had confirmed in practice its declared intention to pursue a policy of neutrality and independence.

The treatment of Communists in the Sudan does not seem to have received any mention in the Soviet press. An exception was the report of the statement issued after the Moscow conference of Communist Parties in November 1960; the meeting expressed "proletarian solidarity" with imprisoned Communists in (among other countries) the Sudan.

Ideological considerations obviously prevent Soviet writers from applauding all internal aspects of the present regime in the Sudan. But, as regards the Sudan's foreign policy, considerations of ideology and Soviet interest alike lead the Soviet commentator to present the Sudan as turning away from the West and towards friendship with the Soviet Union.

AFRICA IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on African affairs appearing in the Soviet press during the period 2nd - 25th February 1961.

Brezhnev's Visit to Morocco, Guinea and Ghana

On 3rd February it was announced that the Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev, had accepted an invitation from President Sekou Toure and the Guinean Government to pay an official visit to Guinea (PRAVDA 3.2.61). Brezhnev left Moscow on 9th February, accompanied by a ministerial delegation (PRAVDA 10.2.61).

Brezhnev arrived in Rabat on 9th February. In the evening King Muhammad gave a dinner in his honour; on the morning of 10th February he went sight-seeing in Rabat; and the Crown Prince Moulay Hasan entertained him to luncheon. The Tass correspondent in Rabat reported statements by the Moroccan political leaders Allal al-Fassi and Abderrahim Buabid welcoming Brezhnev's visit, and articles in the Moroccan press on the subject of Moroccan-Soviet friendship. AL-FAJR, he said, wrote that the Soviet Union "symbolizes the defence of freedom, sovereignty and national dignity"; it had defended the cause of Moroccan freedom, opposed the presence of US and French bases on Moroccan territory, and had supported Morocco over the question of Mauritania. Moroccan newspapers enthusiastically welcomed the coming exchange of visits between Khrushchev and King Muhammad (PRAVDA 11.2.61).

Brezhnev arrived in Conakry on 11th February. In a dispatch on the welcome awaiting him and on the significance of his visit PRAVDA's correspondent Orestov said that Brezhnev was visiting Guinea at a crucial period in its life, when it was trying to remove the last vestiges of colonialism, by nationalizing industrial and public service undertakings and embarking on a three-year plan which would mechanize agriculture and put it on a cooperative basis. The people's confidence in the Democratic Party had just been shown by the virtually unanimous election of Sekou Toure as President, showing their faith in the party's foreign policy of positive neutrality and the development of friendly relations with the socialist countries.

PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA reported speeches made by Sekou Toure and Brezhnev at a Soviet-Guinean friendship meeting in Conakry on 12th February, attended by over 20,000 persons; a speech made by Brezhnev at Labe on 13th February; a speech made by Brezhnev at Kankan on 13th February; a speech made by Brezhnev at Kisidugu on 14th February; and a joint Soviet-Guinean communique issued in Conakry on 15th February.

In his speech in Conakry Brezhnev spoke of the Soviet Union's ideal of building a Communist society. In this and other speeches he spoke of

the Leninist principles underlying the Soviet Union's foreign policy. He referred to the Soviet initiative at the UN in calling for the immediate abolition of colonialism; Soviet agreement with the Casablanca conference resolutions on the Congo and Algeria; Soviet support for "the growing unity of the independent African states", and for Guinea's efforts in this direction; the growth and expansion of Soviet-Guinean relations; and Soviet efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet-Guinean communique referred to the identity of views of both countries on the questions of nuclear disarmament and the liquidation of foreign military bases; the necessity to abolish colonialism in all its forms; the Congo, and the murder of Lumumba ("The responsibility for this foul crime rests with the colonialist government of Belgium, its allies and the UN Secretary-General"); and Algeria. Satisfaction was expressed with the development of Soviet-Guinean economic, scientific and cultural cooperation. "The Soviet side declared that it is prepared to expand deliveries to the Republic of Guinea of the goods it needs, specifically machinery and equipment, oil products, consumer goods and foodstuffs, and also to increase purchases of the traditional commodities of Guinean export."

PRAVDA reported on 16th February that Brezhnev had accepted an invitation from President Nkrumah to visit Ghana. On 16th February Brezhnev and his party left Conakry for Accra. PRAVDA reported the brief speech made by Brezhnev on his arrival in Accra; his speech at a dinner given in his honour by President Nkrumah on 17th February; and his speech at a mass meeting at Winneba on 18th February. Brezhnev spoke of Ghana's great contribution to the liberation of the African peoples from colonialism; of the forthcoming exchange of visits between President Nkrumah and Khrushchev; of the Soviet view of Lumumba's murder, of Mr. Hammarskjoeld's "complicity" in it and Soviet withdrawal of recognition from him as UN Secretary-General; of Soviet sympathy with Ghana's efforts to build up its economy; and of the strides made in industrial, scientific, technical and agricultural development in the USSR since the October Revolution. A joint Soviet-Ghanaian statement issued on 19th February spoke of agreement of views on the most important international questions; denounced the murder of Lumumba; and noted the successful development of Soviet-Ghanaian economic, technical and cultural cooperation.

Congo

The following is a summary of Soviet reports on the Congo situation.

2.2.61 PRAVDA reported Gen. Rikhye's statements at a press conference about foreign military aid to the Congo. It noted that he gave details

of Belgian military assistance to the forces of Tshombe, Kalonji and Mobutu, and that he said that in the regions controlled by the Lumumba-Gizenga government there were no foreign military instructors and no arms were reaching these regions from outside the country.

3.2.61 PRAVDA reported the general statement of policy issued by Gizenga's government at a meeting on 31st January in Stanleyville, and published in Cairo. In foreign policy, it said, the Congolese (Stanleyville) Government would conform to positive neutrality; the Congo must belong to the Congolese, and must not be turned into a field of conflict between East and West; it was to be hoped that the new US administration, "which we welcome with some optimism", would realize this. The representative whom the government was sending to New York would take up his post as lawful representative of the Congolese Government at the UN, and would also establish official contacts with the new US administration.

In a report on the Security Council session of 1st February IZVESTIYA noted that Zorin expressed the hope of more fruitful collaboration of the new US administration with the Security Council; quoted from Mr. Stevenson's statement; and sharply criticized Mr. Hammarskjoeld's attitude. Hammarskjoeld, said IZVESTIYA, had admitted the failure of his policy, but, instead of resigning, was asking for authority to adopt extraordinary measures, including the disarming of the army of the lawful Congolese Government, which would prevent the Congolese patriots from continuing their struggle for independence. "Hammarskjoeld, as we see, is quite unwilling to abandon the role of servant of the Belgian aggressors and their imperialist accomplices."

4.2.61 PRAVDA said that the Security Council session, attended by numerous Afro-Asian delegates, had become in effect a trial of the colonialists, following the Soviet initiative in this direction at the General Assembly session. The shattering criticism directed at all Hammarskjoeld's activity in the Congo would have made "any honest man" hand in his resignation. PRAVDA noted that the Soviet delegate Zorin, while denouncing the UN's activities in the Congo, observed that statements by Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Stevenson suggested that the new US administration was making a critical reappraisal of the Congo situation.

5-9.2.61 Soviet newspapers continued to publish reports alleging that the forces of Mobutu, Tshombe and Kalonji were receiving arms, equipment and aircraft from Belgian, French, South African and NATO sources and that volunteers from these countries were also being recruited. Writing in IZVESTIYA (9.2.61) N. Khokhlov said that the arming of Mobutu's bands was proceeding in the full view of the UN's representatives. As regards the US attitude, it was now known that President Eisenhower, in an exchange of letters with Mobutu through the intermediary of the US

Ambassador Timberlake, had promised Mobutu money and arms; it was not known what attitude the new US administration would adopt on this matter.

11-14.2.61 Soviet newspapers reported the Katanga announcement of Lumumba's escape, and at the same time published various reports that he had been already killed. One of these (PRAVDA 11.2.61) was a story attributed to Modibo Keita, the President of Mali: that, at the beginning of January, contacts were established in Brazzaville, through the agency of Fulbert Youlou, between Bomboko and (via French channels and M. Spaak) the Belgian Compagnie Generale du Congo; the latter promised 800,000 Belgian francs for the assassination of Lumumba, while he was "escaping". IZVESTIYA (14.2.61) said that its Paris correspondent S. Zhykov had managed to secure a telephone connection with Leopoldville, and had spoken to Kamitatu, the head of the Leopoldville provincial government. Asked the latest news about Lumumba, Kamitatu said that in Leopoldville people were inclined to think that the story about his escape was designed to cover up, after the event, measures taken to dispose of him; but there was no evidence either to confirm or refute this.

14.2.61 PRAVDA, in a Tass dispatch from Paris, gave the news of Lumumba's murder. It said that his murder had been planned by Tshombe, Mobutu and Kasavubu together with the Belgian Government and Belgian monopolies (see above). It said that this showed that the colonialists would shrink from no crimes to maintain their privileges in the Congo; but Lumumba's death would only strengthen the Congolese people's struggle for freedom. PRAVDA also reported the White House statement deploring Lumumba's death, and the statements made at the Security Council meeting. It said that Hammarskjoeld's statement deploring the murder was "hypocritical"; he had said nothing about his own personal responsibility for it. The Soviet delegate Zorin had pointed out the justification of the earlier warnings given in the Security Council by the Soviet and Afro-Asian delegates; the disingenuousness of those who had postponed the Security Council session was now apparent. Hammarskjoeld was now calling for an "enquiry" after the crime had already been committed. "The Secretary-General and the UN command in the Congo are accomplices in the crime. After what has happened in the Congo we have no confidence in the Secretary-General." Under the heading "Call the executioners to account!" (a frequent slogan in ensuing days) PRAVDA published an article praising Lumumba's fight for the freedom of the Congo and denouncing the colonialists for his murder.

15.2.61 Soviet newspapers published a "Soviet Government statement in connection with the murder of Patrice Lumumba". This stated that Lumumba's murder was "prepared methodically, step by step, and was sanctioned in fact in no other place but the capitals of the states which bear the responsibility for the criminal aggression unleashed against

the Congo Republic". Katanga, to which Lumumba, Okito and Mpolo "were taken to be done away with", was in fact ruled from Brussels with Belgian money, Belgian arms and Belgian forces; but Belgium was supported and encouraged by "a whole coalition of colonial powers" which must bear responsibility for this grave crime. The murderers had sown the seeds of inextinguishable hatred in the hearts of a generation of Africans. Lumumba's tragic death had exposed afresh the disgraceful role played in the Congo by the UN Secretary-General and the UN command subordinated to him. (The following are some excerpts from the Soviet statement on this subject.)

> "From the very first day...Hammarskjoeld acted in the interests of the Congo's enemies, the Belgian and other colonialists...Under the false mask of impartiality the UN Secretary-General helped the colonialists to dismember and disorganize the Congolese state, and to put weapons in the hands of foreign mercenaries and executioners. It was clear from the UN discussion of this question that the colonialists had entered into a foul collusion with Hammarskjoeld and, as a result, the latter was deliberately temporizing with measures in defence of the legitimate government and parliament of the Congo. When the Prime Minister and other members of the government and parliament of the Congo were seized by mercenaries of the Belgian colonialists, thrown into a dungeon and subjected to inhuman torture, when it was clear to all the world that their life was in danger, Hammarskjoeld would not lift a finger to save the lawfully elected leaders of the Congolese people. It was clear to all that in the prepared assassination of the Prime Minister of the Congo, Hammarskjoeld had been assigned the role of executant of the will of the colonialists, holding the UN flag.
>
> "The murder of Patrice Lumumba and his associates in a Katanga prison was the culmination of Hammarskjoeld's criminal actions. It is clear to all upright people on earth that the blood of Patrice Lumumba is on the hands of this servant of the colonialists, and nothing can wash it away. The states which hold dear the authority of the UN and its future cannot put up with a situation where this organization is represented in the international arena by a miserable lackey of the colonialists. His actions put a stigma on the entire UN organization. This man not only cannot be trusted in the least but, what is more, deserves only the scorn of all honest people. Hammarskjoeld is not fit for the high post of UN Secretary-General and his continued tenure of this position is intolerable."

The statement concluded with five Soviet demands: (1) that the UN should condemn Belgium as responsible for Lumumba's murder, and apply

appropriate sanctions; (2) that Tshombe and Mobutu should be arrested and tried, that all their military forces and gendarmerie should be disarmed, and that all Belgian troops and personnel in the Congo should be removed forthwith; (3) that the UN operation in the Congo should be called off and all foreign troops should be withdrawn; (4) that Dag Hammarskjoeld, "as an accomplice and organizer" of Lumumba's murder, should be dismissed from his office - the Soviet Government for its part would no longer recognize him as an official of the UN; (5) that all freedom-loving states, as their "sacred duty", should render assistance to the legitimate government of the Congo led by acting Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga.

Messages of condolence sent by Khrushchev to Gizenga in Stanleyville and to the widows of Lumumba, Mpolo and Okito were published in the Soviet press on 15th February.

15-25.2.61 Denunciations of Lumumba's murder filled the pages of Soviet newspapers. Equal prominence was given to protests by Soviet organizations, mass meetings and individuals and to reports of demonstrations and protests throughout the world. In the Soviet material, Mr. Hammarskjoeld was the principal target of denunciation. In a dispatch from New York (PRAVDA 18.2.61) B. Strel'nikov said that Hammarskjoeld had asked the New York police to strengthen his personal guard; the UN building now looked like a besieged fortress; "evidently this Judas, like a naughty cat, has not got a clear conscience, since he has been so frightened by popular indignation." In a PRAVDA article on the same day entitled "Hammarskjoeld, bootlicker of the colonialists" Boris Dmitriyev said that, before the meetings of the General Assembly, Hammarskjoeld received directives from Washington and London on the line he should take. He had claimed to be sailing "under my own steam and by my own compass"; but in fact he used a compass produced in the workshops of colonialism. "This compass led him from lies to treachery and from treachery to crime; and in the wake was the blood and suffering of whole peoples...Now everybody sees the face of Dag Hammarskjoeld, which he so carefully conceals under the veil of 'neutrality' and 'objectivity'. It is the disgusting face of a contemptible bootlicker of the colonialists, an assistant of the imperialist hangmen. And for this Judas, who has sold his honour and conscience, there is no place within the UN. Hammarskjoeld must leave the UN!"

18.2.61 A dispatch from a Tass correspondent in Stanleyville, G. Fedyashin, was published in PRAVDA and other Soviet newspapers. He said that the population of Equatoriale province, and of Stanleyville in particular, had very warmly welcomed the statements by the Soviet Government and other friendly governments on their readiness to give aid to the lawful Congolese Government. "The whole of yesterday the hotel room where the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Polish journalists were was

besieged by visitors who considered it their duty to shake our hands and express their gratitude." TRUD of 25th February published an account by Fedyashin of an article in the Stanleyville newspaper UHURU which denounced Mr. Hammarskjoeld as "Enemy Number One" of the Congo.

21-22.2.61 PRAVDA reported at some length the Security Council sessions of 20th-21st February. It said that Mr. Hammarskjoeld's expressions of regret in announcing the murder of six more of Lumumba's colleagues amounted to "hypocritical crocodile tears". The motion put forward by Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR, calling for immediate measures to prevent the occurrence of such outrages, was a "half-way" measure, but, as the Soviet delegate Zorin had said, despite its inadequacies it could have played a positive role.

22.2.61 A Tass dispatch from Beirut, reported in PRAVDA, gave an account of Lebanese press criticisms of the Sudanese refusal to allow Soviet medical supplies for the Congo to pass through the Sudan. The Lebanese public, said Tass, took the view that this amounted to "playing into the hands of the colonizers". (Note: In a message to President Abbud, published in PRAVDA of 30th January, the Chairman of the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Prof. G.A. Miterev asked that foodstuffs and medical supplies and 20 lorries, which were being shipped to Port Sudan, should be allowed passage through Sudanese territory to the Congo.)

25.2.61 PRAVDA reported that the Soviet Council of Ministers had decided that the Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow should in future be known as the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University.

Other Countries and Topics

Algeria PRAVDA's Paris correspondent G. Ratiani said (24.2.61) that an "important event" in the Algerian conflict was the Geneva meeting of French and Algerian trade union delegations. In a communique they had jointly affirmed the necessity for self-determination for Algeria following direct negotiations. As the CGT Secretary-General Benoit Frachon had stated in HUMANITE, the workers of France and Algeria themselves needed no "reconciliation", since there was no discord between them, fighting as they were against the common enemy of French colonialism.

A month and a half had passed since the referendum, said Ratiani, and there was no sign of the peace which the bourgeois press had said would follow it; the only change in Algeria had been the appointment of a new French high command which, like its predecessors, had declared that the army would carry out "pacification to the end". The French

public's view of the government's attitude towards the forthcoming talks with Bourguiba was definitely cynical.

Morocco PRAVDA (2.2.61) reported that King Muhammad V of Morocco had invited Khrushchev to pay an official visit to Morocco; Khrushchev had accepted and had invited the King to pay an official visit to the USSR, which the King had accepted.

Kenya IZVESTIYA (9.2.61) published an article by Yu. Popov on "the election farce" in Kenya. For fifteen years, said Popov, a powerful liberation movement had been in progress in Kenya; for many years the British conducted "punitive operations" and imprisoned thousands of patriots in concentration camps; they had latterly realized that the old methods could not preserve their rule, and called a conference with national representatives to discuss a constitution and elections, but this had no concrete result, and the Colonial Office did not agree to give Kenya independence; it was only through fear of the national liberation movement that the British authorities decided to stage the present elections; but the system of voting and electoral qualifications was such that the majority in the Legislative Council would consist "only of the whites or their henchmen". But the Africans were no longer submissive slaves; they had their own trade unions, organizations and national leaders, and knew their own strength; a widely supported campaign for the release of the national leader of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta was under way; the Kenya trade union federation had declared that it would no longer submit to the ban on its political activity. British newspapers were full of reports of "the resurgence of the underground movement of fighters for independence, which the colonialists tried to deal with by shootings and concentration camps". The people of Kenya, like the inhabitants of other African countries, demanded complete freedom and independence. (Note: Popov's article is of some interest in that it appears to be the first article in recent years in the Soviet daily press - as opposed to articles in periodicals - which has dealt with events in Kenya at any length.)

Northern Rhodesia TRUD (24.2.61) published some short Tass reports from London on the Northern Rhodesian situation. Reporting the call-up of territorial units in the Federation, Tass said: "The white colonizers insolently reject even the insignificant electoral concessions which the British White Paper makes [to the Africans] ...regarding them as an encroachment on their ruling position in the Federation." Tass also reported the Commons exchanges on Northern Rhodesia, and Labour MPs' statements on the question. On the previous day TRUD published, in reply to a reader's request for information on Northern Rhodesia, an article by G. Pegin on recent developments. This stated, among other things, that in June 1960 "28 concentration camps" were set up in

Northern Rhodesia; that the number of prisoners had steadily increased, and was now over 6,000, "but the number of staunch fighters for the freedom of Northern Rhodesia is increasing even more quickly"; that the "paltry concessions" made to the nationalists at the London conference were withdrawn under pressure from "local racists" and from Right-wing Conservatives in London; and that the UNIP leaders had declared that they were ready to die in defence of the freedom of their country.

Portuguese Africa Soviet newspapers published agency messages and Western press reports on disturbances in Luanda. IZVESTIYA (7.2.61) said that the "courageous exploit" of Capt. Galvao in the Santa Maria had stirred up the national liberation movement in Angola. Some long articles on the situation in the Portuguese territories were published (IZVESTIYA 3.2.61; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9.2.61; PRAVDA 6.2.61 - the latter by Mario de Andrade, President of the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

The trade union movement in Africa The alleged "secret British cabinet paper" on the trade union movement in Africa, which the Soviet Government refuses to admit is a forgery (see THE TIMES of 9.3.61), was the subject of a dispatch in PRAVDA (8.2.61) from the newspaper's Accra correspondent Orestov. This document, said Orestov, was made public at the time of the ILO conference in Lagos in December. It stated that it was vital to keep the African trade unions under the influence of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the British representatives in which were in close touch with the Colonial Office and other ministries and also with experts of the intelligence service. Recent events in Africa had increased the importance of the trade unions as a new instrument of Western influence and especially as a brake on political extremism and irresponsible nationalism. At the same time US influence in ICFTU, as a means towards increasing US penetration in Africa, must be resisted. But, above all, the formation of an independent All-Africa Trade Union Federation was not in the interests of the West, and must not be permitted.

Such a document, said Orestov, required no commentary. Recently the decision was taken in Accra to form an All-Africa Trade Union Federation. "This is a sufficient reply by African workers to the intrigues of the imperialists."

The UN Economic Commission for Africa The Addis Ababa session of the UN Economic Commission for Africa was attended by a Soviet delegation headed by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.S. Semenov. Khrushchev sent a message of greetings to the session, in which he spoke of the importance of the UN declaration on independence for colonial peoples (PRAVDA 6.2.61). PRAVDA's special correspondent I. Belayev said that

in their speeches the delegates of Mali, the UAR, Guinea and the Sudan had taken up "anti-imperialist positions", but the delegates of Gabon, Senegal and the "Brazzaville group" of countries had "tried to drown the problems vital for Africa in a flood of eulogies of the French colonialists, for having allegedly granted freedom and independence to their former colonies".

Soviet tourists' visit to Africa On 6th February the Estoniya sailed from Odessa with a large party of Soviet tourists on a 37-day cruise which would take them to Turkey, Italy, Morocco, Senegal, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Turkey and Greece. This is the first Soviet cruise to African countries (TRUD 8.2.61).

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